Understanding Maryland’s Special Statute Regarding Injuries Caused By Dogs

Understanding Maryland’s Special Statute Regarding Injuries Caused By Dogs

By Heidi Wolff-Stanton

In April 2014, Maryland enacted a statute to deal with personal injury or death caused by dogs. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1901.
Prior to the statute, cases of this type were entirely governed by the common law and modifications to the common law developed by the Maryland courts.
See e.g. Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 50 A.3d 1075 (2012). The new statute modified the common law in important ways.

Significantly, part of this statute imposes strict liability on the dog owner for injury or death caused by the dog under specified circumstances. The statutory provisions are not limited to injuries or death caused by dog bites but can be used to obtain compensation in other situations, such as injuries or death sustained when a dog jumps on a person and knocks them down. Pursuant to subsection (c) of the statute, the dog’s owner is strictly liable for injuries or death caused by the dog while the dog is “running at large.” Victims do not have to prove that the owner was negligent or that the dog was previously known to have vicious or dangerous propensities.

However, subsection (c) also sets forth three important exceptions under which the dog owner may not be liable.
The law does not protect trespassers, those committing or attempting to commit a crime, or those tormenting, abusing, or provoking the dog.

Subsection (c) with its statutory strict liability places a clear duty on the dog owner to keep the dog under control so that the dog is not “running at large.” The statute does not define the term “running at large.”
However, the Appellate Court of Maryland has interpreted the term to mean “free, unrestrained, or not under control.” Blitzer v. Breski, 259 Md. App. 257, 275, 303 A.3d 88, 98 (2023), cert. denied, 486 Md. 237, 306 A.3d 648 (2023). The court has also held that liability can be imposed even though the dog bite or other injury occurred on the owner’s premises (unless the victim was a trespasser or attempting to commit a crime). See id. at 276, 303 A.3d at 99 (“[A] dog owner could be liable if the owner’s dog causes injury or death to a person while that person is on the owner’s property, provided that that person was not committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense.”).

In addition, with strict liability, contributory negligence may not be a viable defense. See May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 446 Md. 1, 24 n.21, 129 A.3d 984, 997 n.21 (2015) (“[C]ontributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim.”). However, consider the exception in subsection (c) regarding the victim “teasing, tormenting, abusing, or provoking the dog.” This conduct is effectively a built-in (albeit limited) contributory negligence defense. Also, assumption of risk may still be available as a defense in a strict liability case. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597, 495 A.2d 348, 356 (1985)

In addition to strict liability for dog owners under certain circumstances, subsection (d) of the statute also makes clear that the statute does not displace any common law cause of action, any common law defense (i.e. contributory negligence), or immunity. Thus, in addition to attempting to recover under the strict liability provision of the statute, a victim of a dog bite or other injury caused by a dog can seek to recover under a common law negligence theory even when the dog was not running at large if the dog owner fails to exercise reasonable care to prevent the dog from causing harm to others. For example, if the dog owner knows that the dog has a history of aggressiveness and does not take sufficient steps to secure or restrain the dog, the victim could perhaps recover for negligence even if the dog was leashed. However, with a common law cause of action also comes the potentially problematic common law defense of contributory negligence.

Much of Section 3-1901 talks about “the owner of a dog.” The term “owner” is not defined in the statute and has been the source of litigation. See e.g. Latz v. Parr, 251 Md. App. 442, 445, 254 A.3d 509, 511 (2021) (defendant and his girlfriend jointly adopted the dog and, even though the girlfriend was the primary custodian, defendant was an “owner” under § 3-1901). But what about the potential liability of persons other than an owner? Subsection (b) covers this point by expressly retaining the common law as it “existed on April 1, 2012.” Thus, to recover for the non-owner’s negligence would require, among other things, evidence that the non-owner knew of the dog’s vicious propensities.

Finally, subsection (a) of the statute creates a significant rebuttable presumption and rule. With evidence that the dog caused the injury, there is created a rebuttable presumption that the dog’s owner knew or should have known that the dog had vicious or dangerous propensities. And, in a jury trial, the judge may not rule as a matter of law that the presumption has been rebutted before the jury returns a verdict.
This rebuttable presumption would certainly be important in cases where strict liability is not involved.
To read the full text of Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1901, see https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/laws/StatuteText?article=gcj§ion=3-1901.

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